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I. DEFINING THE EXCITED UTTERANCE EXCEPTION
The Federal Rules of Evidence define hearsay as an out-of-court statement that is
offered into evidence for the truth of the matter asserted.2 Hearsay is traditionally
excluded as evidence because the courts are concerned with protecting each party’s
ability to rebut statements which are offered against that party.3 Hearsay deprives
the party against whom the hearsay is offered of the ability to cross-examine the
declarant in court to test the declarant’s memory, sincerity, perception, and narration

1

J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of Law; B.A, University of
California, Los Angeles. I would like to thank my mother, Caroline Shen and my sister, Hua
Tran; for their support, guidance, and encouragement throughout law school and throughout
my life. I would also like to thank Professor Roger Park of the University of California,
Hastings College of Law for his supervision of this article.
2

FED. R. EVID. 801.

3

See ROGER C. PARK, DAVID P. LEONARD & STEVEN H. GOLDBERG, EVIDENCE LAW: A
STUDENT’S GUIDE TO EVIDENCE AS APPLIED TO AMERICAN TRIALS § 7.01 (1998) [hereinafter
EVIDENCE LAW].
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of the statement.4 Cross-examination is critical because, “[t]he theory of the hearsay
rule . . . is that the many possible sources of inaccuracy and untrustworthiness which
may lie underneath the bare untested assertion of a witness can best be brought to
light and exposed, if they exist, by the test of cross-examination.”5
To ameliorate the rigid application of the rule against hearsay, the Federal Rules
of Evidence have enumerated many categorical exceptions and exemptions.6 The
exceptions exist for situations when the hearsay is particularly trustworthy because
the out-of-court statement does not present the usual hearsay dangers.7 One such
exception is the excited utterance exception in Federal Rule of Evidence 803(2),
which states that regardless of whether the hearsay declarant is available to testify as
a witness to be cross-examined, “[a] statement relating to a startling event or
condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the
event or condition” may be admitted for the truth of the matter asserted.8 Professor
John Henry Wigmore articulated three requirements in the exception: 1) a startling
occasion 2) which generates a statement related to the circumstances of the
occurrence 3) that is made before time to fabricate.9
Excited utterances are said to lack the same reliability dangers as classic hearsay,
and therefore may supplant in-court testimony, because the utterance is unlikely to
be fabricated as there is no time for peaceful reflection and the utterance has not yet
been subject to the influences of the adversarial court system.10 Excited utterances
do not present the credibility dangers of hearsay because the immediacy of the
statement to the exciting event when made during the period of heightened emotions,
obviates problems of memory or insincerity.11
The justification for the excited utterance exception stems from the reasoning that
because the declarant is in an intensely stressful and highly emotional state, she is
not afforded an opportunity to contemplate and therefore fabricate what she excitedly
4

See Lawrence H. Tribe, Triangulating Hearsay, 87 HARV. L. REV. 957, 958-61 (1974).

5

5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1420 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1974).

6

See FED. R. EVID. 801, 803 804, 807.

7
See WIGMORE, supra note 5, at §§ 1420, 1422; PARK ET AL., EVIDENCE LAW, supra note 3,
at § 7.12.
8

FED R EVID. 803(2).

9

See 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1750 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1976).

10

See PARK ET AL., EVIDENCE LAW, supra note 3, at § 7.12; see also Tribe, supra note 4, at
958-61.
11

See WIGMORE, supra note 9, at § 1749.
[The] circumstantial guarantee here consists in the consideration, already noted . . .
that in the stress of nervous excitement the reflective faculties may be stilled and the
utterance may become the unreflecting and sincere expression of one’s actual
impressions and belief. The utterance it is commonly said must be “spontaneous,”
“natural,” “impulsive,” “instinctive,” “generated by an exciting feeling which extends
without let or breakdown from the moment of the event they illustrate.”
Id. Additionally, from the requirement that the statement be made during a period where the
declarant is subject to the “stress of continuous excitement,” stems an implicit time element
that suggests that such statements generally must be made contemporaneously with the
exciting event.
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declares.12 Professor Wigmore has articulated the earliest restatement of the
principles underlying the modern exception:
[U]nder certain circumstances of physical shock, a stress of nervous
excitement may be produced which stills the reflective faculties and
removes their control, so that the utterance which then occurs is a
spontaneous and sincere response to the actual sensations and perceptions
already produced by the external shock. Since this utterance is made
under the immediate and uncontrolled domination of the senses, and
during the brief period when considerations of self-interest could not have
been brought fully to bear by reasoned reflection, the utterance may be
taken as particularly trustworthy (or at least as lacking the usual grounds
of untrustworthiness), and thus as expressing the real tenor of the
speaker’s belief as to the facts just observed by him; and may therefore be
received as testimony to those facts.13
Therefore, the excited statement lacks traditionally obscuring factors common to
hearsay because the declarant’s “mind has been suddenly made subject to an
overpowering emotion caused by some unexpected and shocking occurrence.”14
II. RAMIFICATIONS ON THE APPLICATION OF THE EXCITED UTTERANCE EXCEPTION
AFTER THE REEXCITEMENT ANALYSIS SET FORTH IN UNITED STATES V. NAPIER
The current application of the excited utterance exception is contentious, namely
because of the divergent court interpretations of the timing element and the cause of
the excitement element. Critics claim that these prongs have been applied
inconsistently and have become increasingly more relaxed in recent years. Perhaps
one of the more controversial applications of these two prongs rests in the Ninth
Circuit’s opinion in United States v. Napier.15
In Napier, the defendant was alleged of kidnapping a female victim after stealing
her vehicle and beating her severely.16 The victim’s blood and hair and the
defendant’s fingerprints were found on a broken rifle, which was discovered beside
the victim’s unconscious body.17 Though the rifle alone provided evidence which
substantially implicated the defendant, his fingerprints were also discovered on the
steering wheel of the victim’s vehicle, and his personal documents and other items
were discovered inside the victim’s purse.18

12

See PARK ET AL., EVIDENCE LAW, supra note 3, at § 7.12.

13

WIGMORE, supra note 9, at § 1747.

14

Lira v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 384 Pa. Super. 503, 512 (1989). But see Robert M.
Hutchins & Donald Slesinger, Note, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence: Spontaneous
Exclamations, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 432 (1928) (noting that excitement may actually impair
rather than improve accuracy of observation).
15

518 F.2d 316, 317-18 (9th Cir. 1975).

16

Id. at 317.

17

Id.

18

Id.
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The victim—who had suffered significant brain damage as a result of the vicious
attack—was hospitalized for approximately seven weeks, during which time she
underwent two brain operations in an attempt to mitigate the damage incurred from
her head injuries.19 The serious injuries resulting from the ordeal left the victim
unable to comprehend the significance of an oath and incapable to testify at a trial.20
Although the victim’s communication was limited to isolated words and simple
phrases frequently precipitated by stress and strain, the hospital found that her
memory remained intact.21 A week after the victim was released from the hospital,
her sister showed her a newspaper article.22 The newspaper article contained a
photograph of the defendant, her alleged attacker.23 Upon viewing the photograph,
the victim began to show immediate signs of apprehension, great distress, and horror.
The victim pointed directly to the defendant’s photograph and repeating frantically,
“He killed me!”24 The Ninth Circuit held that the victim’s out-of-court statement
was admissible under the excited utterance exception, even though the utterance took
place a considerable time (more than eight weeks) after her physical attack.25
The facts in Napier consist of two “exciting” events: 1) the original attack and 2)
the event of the victim viewing the attacker’s photograph in the newspaper.26
Normally, one would classify the events consisting of the physical attack and the
kidnapping as the “exciting event” that triggered the utterance. The Ninth Circuit,
however, found that the startling event of physically viewing the photograph of her
attacker fulfilled the “exciting event” prong of the excited utterance exception.27
The Ninth Circuit’s analysis in Napier is particularly disconcerting because it
potentially permits excited utterances into evidence where there have been two
“exciting events,” but only the first is objectively exciting enough to satisfy the dual

19

Id.

20

Id.

21

Id.

22

Id.

23

Id.

24

Id.

25

Id. at 318.

26

See Stephen A. Saltzburg, Excited Utterances and Family Violence, 15 CRIM. JUST. 39,
39-40 (2001).
What makes Napier atypical is that the attack, which was too far removed from the
statement for the declarant to have remained continuously under its influence, was not
the startling event. When the court of appeals agreed that the statement was
admissible, despite the fact that a week had passed since the assault, it was because it
was based on another startling event: i.e., the recognition of the assailant in the
newspaper. The statement was clearly made under the influence of that startling
event, and the court assumed that the statement was sufficiently related to that event to
be admissible under Rule 803(2).
Id.
27

Napier, 518 F.2d at 318.
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protections of the excited utterance exception.28 The following hypothetical
situations illustrate the problems raised by Napier’s use of the reexcitement analysis
in the excited utterance hearsay exception.
A. Hypothetical # 1
Strictly applying Napier, excited statements made by a victim after identifying
her accused attacker from a lineup would be admissible, even though the victim may
have been contaminated by post-event information (such as photo arrays of potential
suspects). Thus, the victim may recognize an individual in the lineup only because
of this information without consciously realizing it. Furthermore, because the law
enforcement officials who conduct the lineup know who the suspect is, they also
may subtly or blatantly influence the identification. The victim has likely been the
subject of several police interrogations and has been subject to the considerable
pressures of influential questioning. Despite these compromising factors, the victim
could still circumvent potential hearsay challenges to the protracted duration of time
elapsing from her original attack, by claiming that the subsequent event of “viewing
the accused”—not the original attack—was the traumatizing event which triggered
her excitement. The possible admission of this statement is especially problematic
because there should be no “case in any jurisdiction which stands for the proposition
that a request to identify followed by a deliberate choosing of an offender from a
lineup . . . qualifies as an excited utterance.”29 Nevertheless, the reexcitement theory
has already been applied to admit assertive conduct by a victim upon viewing her
assailant in a lineup under the excited utterance exception.30
B. Hypothetical # 2
An exculpatory statement made by an accused murderer during her arrest, days
after the murder, could also be admissible under a mechanical application of Napier,
even though the murderer had ample time to contemplate her actions or to be
prejudiced by outside influences. The murderer could evade using the murder as the
exciting event, by instead referencing the event of the arrest—though days after the
original murder—as the agitating and highly emotional event which triggered the
statement.
Clearly, such declarations in the preceding hypotheticals were not intended to be
protected under the excited utterance exception either by the drafters of the Federal
Rules or by Professor Wigmore, the central proponent of the modern day excited
utterance exception. To admit such statements might unduly expand the excited
utterance exception, because under the reexcitement analysis, statements triggered by
objectively calm events—events which may be subjectively exciting only to the

28
An excited utterance is considered more trustworthy because an agitated individual who
has no time to peacefully reflect upon the exciting event is unlikely to fabricate his statements
and has not yet been subjected to the influence of an adversarial court system.
29

Johnson v. State, 934 S.W.2d 179, 183 (Ark. 1996).

30

See State v. Meyer, 694 S.W.2d 853, 856 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that assertive
conduct by a rape victim who was “shaking,” “fearful,” and “noticeably affected” by
spontaneously recoiling upon viewing her alleged rapist in a lineup fulfilled the requirements
of an excited utterance under the Napier reexcitement analysis).
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specific declarant—could be admissible.31 Furthermore, the reexcitement application
to the excited utterance exception raises profound questions because
[i]n most cases, the nexus (if it exists) is a direct one, for the utterance
describes an exciting event that is itself the subject matter of the case . . . .
(“Most often the excited utterance, as a practical matter, relates to the
exciting cause, i.e., description of an accident, an attack . . .”). Where an
exciting event is the stimulus for a statement about something other than
that event, a concern arises that the declarant might be speaking from
conscious reflection, and hence the statement’s reliability is in doubt.32
Under the reexcitement analysis, the nexus between the exciting event and the
statement is too far removed because the statement is actually triggered by another
event that reexcites a memory of the initial event, rather than the “exciting event”
alone.33
III. DANGERS PRESENT IN THE REEXCITEMENT ANALYSIS
No hearsay exception can perfectly distinguish between statements that are
fabricated or truthful; however, the purpose of the excited utterance exception is to
use palpable evidence such as lapse of time, the occurrence of an exciting event and
a highly emotional state to best gauge accuracy and trustworthiness.34 Elements of
the exception cannot stand alone; they must each work in unison for an outside
observer to make a fully informed conjecture about the declarant’s reliability. “The
defendant’s only protection against the admission of fabricated testimony or [an]
unfounded rumor is that there be sufficient safeguards to assure the statement’s
reliability.”35 Excited utterances are only reliable if they are not subject to external
influences and there has been insufficient time and capacity for the declarant to
engineer a false statement.36 Unfortunately, these policy justifications behind the
excited utterance exception may not be fully considered under the reexcitement
analysis.

31

One court has observed that “[t]he uniquely subjective nature of the determination of
what constitutes a sufficiently startling event is vividly illustrated in United States v. Napier.”
State v. Carlson, 808 P.2d 1002, 1011 (Or. 1991) (emphases added).
32

Commonwealth v. Santiago, 774 N.E.2d 143, 147-48 (Mass. 2002) (citations omitted).

33

See State v. Gordon, 952 S.W.2d 817, 820 (Tenn. 1997) (“Although the ‘startling event’
is usually the act or transaction upon which the legal controversy is based . . . the exception is
not limited to statements arising directly from such events; rather, a subsequent startling event
or condition which is related to the prior event can produce an excited utterance.”); State v.
DiBartolo, No. 17261-9-III 2000 WL 968474, at *14 (Wash. Ct. App. 3, July 13, 2000) (“The
startling event or condition need not be the ‘principal act’ underlying the case. For example, a
later startling event may trigger associations with an original trauma, recreating the stress
earlier produced and causing the person to exclaim spontaneously.”) (citations omitted).
34

See WIGMORE, supra note 9, at § 1750.

35

Brooks Holland, Using Excited Utterances to Prosecute Domestic Violence in New York:
The Door Opens Wide, Or Just a Crack? 8 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L. J. 171, 179 (2002)
(emphasis added).
36

See PARK ET. AL., EVIDENCE LAW, supra note 3, at § 7.12.
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As the preceding hypotheticals illustrate, the court’s reasoning in Napier fatally
disregards how external influences on the victim might have tainted the reliability of
the victim’s statements. The facts indicate that the victim’s sister showed her a
picture of the accused from a newspaper. The facts, however, are silent regarding
the context in which the picture was shown.37 Consequently, it is far from
inconceivable that the sister—who, because of her relationship with the victim, had a
possible bias in implicating the defendant—may have unduly influenced the victim,
especially given the victim’s impaired capacity and highly vulnerable state. That the
sister deliberately showed the defendant’s photo to the victim itself suggests that she
may have suspected the defendant. Unfortunately, the failure of the Napier court to
account for these highly germane external influences undermines the sanctity of the
precedent establishing the reexcitement analysis of the excited utterance exception.38
Napier’s assessment of how unique psychological states affect one’s
trustworthiness is a meritorious consideration in applying the excited utterance
exception. There are an assortment of chronic psychological syndromes that do not
fit cleanly within the excited utterance exception and consequently should toll the
“excited state” requirement or allow for the statement to fall under the exception
because it constitutes “reexcitement.” Such chronic syndromes and mental
impairments include situations where the declarant suffers from unremitting physical
pain, or where the declarant is a victim of a psychologically debilitating crime such
as rape or brutal physical battery.39 Following Napier, other courts have admitted
excited utterances “made well after the event when the declarant was suddenly
37

See Napier, 518 F.2d at 317.

38

See Holland, supra note 35, at 188 (“[A]ggressive questioning may undermine the
reliability of a statement that otherwise would qualify as an excited utterance.”).
39

Professor Aviva Orenstein has spoken about how the documented reaction of women to
rape and other sexual violence is plagued by preconceptions ingrained within the structure of
the excited utterance exception on the appropriate reaction to highly emotional events. Aviva
Orenstein, MY GOD!: A Feminist Critique of the Excited Utterance Exception to the Hearsay
Rule, 85 CAL. L. REV. 159, 199-203 (1997). The excited utterance exception is problematic
because “[b]y requiring a prompt utterance and visible signs of distress, the excited utterance
exception fails to reflect the reported experiences of rape survivors, who often are too
disoriented, numb, afraid, or ashamed to issue a prompt statement, excited or otherwise.” Id.
at 163. Furthermore, the excited utterance exception excludes “hearsay statements that may
provide increased information and context, particularly where the survivor is traumatized,
embarrassed, or is otherwise a reticent witness.” Id. at 164.
The excited utterance exception relies on the assumption that victims will immediately and
passionately exclaim implicating evidence about their ordeal. This, however, ignores the fact
that female victims of rape may undergo a psychological paralysis where they may be
uncommunicative and experience emotional withdrawal similar to the unconsciousness as in
the Napier case. Orenstein claims that “psychological data indicate that, as a self-protective
device, witnesses may initially suppress unpleasant memories, which only emerge in later,
calmer times [and] . . . the witness’ ability to recall will not be at its best so near in time to the
traumatic event.” Id. at 182. Due to Rape Trauma Syndrome, “a rape victim may be calm
directly following the incident and subsequently become agitated when feeling safe. It is
when the victim feels safe that the victim will be likely to report the details of the crime.”
Angela Conti & Brian Gitnik, Federal Rule of Evidence 803(2): Problems with the Excited
Utterance Exception to the Rule on Hearsay, 14 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 227, 241-42
(1999).
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subjected to rekindled excitement” because “[e]vents may so deeply traumatize a
person that long after stress has subsided a chance reminder may have enormous
psychological impact, causing renewed stress and excitement and educing utterances
relating to the original trauma.”40
Questions pertaining to the psychological state of the victim raised in Napier may
have surprising repercussions in cases involving conditions such as Rape Trauma
Syndrome.41 Under a theory proposed by a scholar in this area, female victims of
violence sometimes will not make excited statements regarding traumatizing events
until after the danger has passed because of self-deprecating emotions such as fear,
shame, and doubt.42 Furthermore, the liberalization of the standard of measurement
for a “startling event” as seen in Napier has weighty implications in the realm of
domestic violence law.43 In a relationship of constant domestic abuse, there could be

40

In the Matter of Troy P., 842 P.2d 742, 746-47 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992).

41

See Orenstein, supra note 39, at 199-203 (criticizing the excited utterance exception for
failing to encompass such gender-specific reactions to brutal crimes as the Rape Trauma
Syndrome).
42

See id. at 204 (explaining a female victim’s reaction to rape if she is afflicted with Rape
Trauma Syndrome).
43
The excited utterance exception has gained great importance in domestic violence cases,
namely because “[a]round the country, a growing number of prosecutors now use the excited
utterance exception to the hearsay rule when attempting to prove their cases without the
testimony of the victim.” Heather Fleniken Cochran, Improving Prosecution of Battering
Partners: Some Innovations in the Law of Evidence, 7 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 89, 107-08 (1997)
(emphasis added). Studies show that prosecutors use the exception as much as sixty-four
percent of the time when the victim refuses to testify against her assailant. See id. at 108. One
scholar writes that “[j]udges, who realize that abusers are unlikely to be convicted without
victim testimony, have expanded the excited utterance exception to include statements made
long after the underlying event. In effect, these judges have used the law of evidence in an
effort to curtail domestic violence.”
Jeffrey S. Siegel, Timing Isn’t Everything:
Massachusetts’ Expansion of the Excited Utterance Exception in Severe Criminal Cases, 79 B.
U. L. REV. 1241, 1267-68 (1999); see also Holland, supra note 35, at 175-77 (commenting on
the extensive use of the excited utterance exception in the realm of domestic violence
adjudication).
It is reasonable to attribute the frequency of use of the exception to the atypical patterns of
behavior and pronounced psychological ramifications in domestic violence cases. “Domestic
violence . . . can prove very unique it its ability to traumatize beyond the degree of any
isolated offense that may be charged.” Id. at 180-81. In fact, “[c]reative prosecutors may
attempt to use a defendant’s history of abuse against a complainant to help the court appreciate
how a seemingly less serious incident—such as a defendant’s mere presence before the
complainant—would prove most terrifying, let alone, ‘startling and upsetting,’ if considered in
context.” Id.
The statistics documenting the frequency of domestic violence are profoundly disturbing,
for “[d]omestic violence is a criminal justice and public policy epidemic of enormous
proportions.” Andrea M. Kovach, Note, Prosecutorial Use of Other Acts of Domestic
Violence for Propensity Purposes: A Brief Look at Its Past, Present, and Future, 2003 U. ILL.
L. REV. 1115, 1116 (2003). “There has only recently been reliable data on the prevalence of
domestic violence in the United States. One out of every five U.S. women has been physically
assaulted by an intimate partner.” Id.; see also H. Morley Swingle et al. Unhappy Families:
Prosecuting and Defending Domestic Violence Cases, 58 J. MO. B. 220 (2002).
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many objectively calm events that could occur over the lifetime of the entire
relationship that may be enough to constitute a subjectively “startling event” under
the Napier analysis.
One must clearly distinguish between the two problematic areas under Napier’s
reexcitement theory: 1) the subjective/objective distinction and 2) the
continuous/interrupted distinction. It is only where a subjective test is applied that
the time between the excited state and the statement is interrupted by an intervening
period of calm that the reexcitement evils arise. Merely having a subjective test,
though, would not raise these problems if the subjective excitement were required to
be continuous.
IV. REEXCITEMENT CASES AFTER NAPIER
In the many cases following the Napier decision, courts have attempted to avoid
confronting the thorny issues nearly asphyxiating the reexcitement theory.
Generally, courts have reiterated that the Ninth Circuit’s Napier reexcitement
Although victims can be from either sex, the overwhelming majority [of the victims of
domestic violence] are female. More than two million women are assaulted by
spouses or boyfriends every year. A woman is abused every 15 seconds, making
domestic abuse the leading cause of injury to women aged 15 to 44, accounting for
more injuries than accidents, muggings and rapes combined.
Id. Linell A. Letendre, Note, Beating Again and Again and Again: Why Washington Needs a
New Rule of Evidence Admitting Prior Acts of Domestic Violence, 75 WASH. L. REV. 973,
976 (2000) (“Domestic violence affects more people than any other health-care problem in the
United States. The Department of Justice estimates that more than 800,000 women are
assaulted, beaten, or raped by their intimate partners each year.”).
Most important to the reexcitement analysis, “[a]lthough a [domestic] violence assault is
undoubtedly a stressful and startling event, the victim may respond instead by withdrawing,
becoming sullen, or going into shock, as opposed to conveying ‘excitement.’ In such an
instance, failure of the declarant to be excited presents an arbitrary barrier to admissibility.”
Douglas E. Beloof & Joel Shapiro, Let the Truth Be Told: Proposed Hearsay Exceptions to
Admit Domestic Violence Victims’ Out of Court Statements as Substantive Evidence, 11
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 7 (2002); see also Tom Lininger, Evidentiary Issues in Federal
Prosecutions of Violence Against Women, 36 IND. L. REV. 687, 713 (2003).
Given modern technology, rape cases are not so dependent on a victim’s hearsay
statements: the presence of the defendant’s bodily fluid or other biological evidence
on the victim’s person, coupled with bruises or other evidence that the victim withheld
consent, would be a strong basis on which to prosecute a rape case even without the
admission of the victim’s hearsay statements. By contrast, a typical prosecution of
domestic violence in state court depends more heavily on hearsay statements, either
because the offender’s identity is not readily apparent from the physical evidence, or
because the offender may try to ascribe the defendant’s injuries to a fall or some other
“innocent” case. Id.
The Napier analysis, therefore, may contribute to aiding victims of domestic violence,
particularly because the Ninth Circuit used a subjective standard based on the experiences of
the victim to measure whether the event was sufficiently exciting. In cases of domestic abuse,
the victim may provide different statements regarding the defendant/abuser’s conduct at
different emotional stages. Furthermore, complications arise in this area of law because,
though “[t]he length of time between the startling event and her statement is not determinative,
. . . it is an important factor . . . . When domestic violence is part of an ongoing reign of terror,
it is difficult to say when the violence starts or stops.” State v. Mineo, No. 24993-6-II, 2001
WL 30184 at *3-4 (Wash. Ct. App. 2, January 12, 2001) (citation omitted).
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concept is legitimate, but confine the reexcitement theory to uniquely trustworthy
circumstances or highly egregious facts. Perhaps the most detailed case to undertake
a comprehensive discussion of the reexcitement theory is Bayne v. State, a decision
from the Maryland Court of Special Appeals.44
Similar to the facts in Napier, the facts of Bayne are emotionally compelling and
involve a victim of a violent crime. In Bayne, a five-year-old female victim was
visiting the home of her uncle, aunt, and cousin, their male child.45 Upon entering
the cousin’s bedroom, the uncle discovered the victim atop her cousin performing
simulated sexual motions in a suggestive position.46 Upon his discovery, the
victim’s uncle immediately accosted her and asked what she was doing and if anyone
had taught the victim to act in that manner.47 The victim ran from the bedroom and
seemed panicked and confused.48 The victim’s uncle then related the incident to the
victim’s grandmother when the grandmother came to bring the victim home.49
Later, upon arriving at the victim’s home (also the residence of the alleged
defendant and the victim’s mother), the victim refused to go in, and began to scream,
“No, no, I don’t want to go in, I don’t want to go in!”50 The victim continued to
scream and remained upset even after her grandmother attempted to console her and
ask what was wrong.51 The grandmother then drove the victim to a convenience
store, where the victim told the grandmother, “I don’t want to go back in the house
Mama. Butch [the defendant] hurts me. He touches me all over, he hurts me.”52
The victim then made motions to her grandmother of how the defendant had touched
her between the legs and on her body.53 Throughout the recitation of the ordeal, the
victim was frightened, shaking, crying, and screaming.54 The victim was admitted to
a hospital and the police were immediately notified.55
At trial, the victim testified how the defendant had touched and rubbed his
“privates” against hers.56 The victim’s grandmother also testified at trial of noticing
bruises on the victim’s legs and buttocks and having previously observed the
defendant entering the victim’s bedroom around 3:00 am.57 The court affirmed the
44

632 A.2d 476 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993).

45

Id. at 477.

46

Id. at 477, 490.

47

Id.

48

Id. at 490.

49

Id. at 477.

50

Id. at 478, 490.

51

Id. at 490.

52

Id.

53

Id. at 478, 490.

54

Id. at 490.

55

Id. at 478.

56

Id.

57

Id.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol52/iss4/4

10

2004-05]

CRYING WOLF OR AN EXCITED UTTERANCE?

537

reexcitement theory set forth in Napier, and held that the victim’s excited statements
were admissible under the excited utterance exception because the rousing event of
being verbally disciplined by her uncle reexcited emotions stemming from the
original molestation by the defendant.58 The victim was emotional throughout the
twenty minutes which elapsed from her confrontation with her uncle, and therefore
did not have the reflective faculties necessary to fabricate her statements.59 The court
held as follows:
[A]n otherwise qualified excited utterance that includes comments about a
prior happening may be admissible under the excited
utterance/spontaneous declaration exception to the happening may be
hearsay evidence rule if the subsequent startling event that generates the
utterance relates directly or indirectly to that prior event, i.e., is likely to
produce an exclamation about the prior event. [There exists] a relationship
between the subsequent and prior events . . . . The time between the prior
event, the subsequent event, and the utterance are all factors that may be
considered by the trial court in determining whether the utterance is
indeed a spontaneous declaration or exclamation . . . . [T]he trial court
judge is uniquely situated to make that determination.60
Because the excited utterance exception focuses on the declarant’s mental ability to
fabricate, not the amount of time that has elapsed, the court held that there was no
reason “why a subsequent related startling event cannot be the startling event that
produces an excited utterance about a prior event or why that excited utterance
cannot be considered for admission under the excited utterance exception to the
hearsay rule.”61 The Bayne court, nonetheless, qualified the reexcitement rule: “The
trial court, of course, would still have to consider all elements, including the passage
of time and opportunity for fabrication or excuse, in resolving the issue of
spontaneity . . . to rule on admissibility.”62
Despite Bayne’s discussion buttressing the reexcited utterance concept through
reasoning and extensive case law, Bayne suffers from the same critical flaw present
in Napier—both fail to account for the external influences that may have tainted the
declarant’s reexcited utterances. In Bayne, the victim was calm from the period
beginning with the confrontation with her uncle and ending when her grandmother
parked in front of the convenience store. The fact finder does not know whether the
grandmother may have deliberately or inadvertently influenced the victim to accuse
the defendant, especially since the grandmother provided the primary account of the
events during the intervening period of calm. One can surmise that perhaps the
58

Id. at 492.

59

Id. at 491-92.

60

Id. at 489 (emphases added).

61

Id. (emphases added).

62

Id.; see also United States v. Hill, 13 M.J. 882, 885 (U.S. Armed Forces 1982) (“The
factors to be considered [in determining whether the declarant is excited] include lapse of time
between the startling event and the utterance, as well as, the declarant’s age, physical and
mental condition, the circumstances of the event, and the declarant’s basis for knowing the
statements to be true and accurate.”).
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grandmother may have disapproved of the defendant living with the victim’s mother,
and spoke to the victim suggestively before the child made her declarations. Perhaps
the child victim knew that the grandmother had a preexisting suspicion of the
defendant, and only made her excited statement after her grandmother gave outward
signs of approval. Regardless of whether these proposed facts were present in the
Bayne case, grave issues exist concerning the admissibility of reexcited utterances.
If one allows the admission of reexcited statements, one is limited to the utterance
alone and precluded from corroborating evidence of the pressures that may severely
undermine its reliability.
Other high-level state courts have also spoken to the reexcitement issue and
affirmed the analysis both implicitly and explicitly:
First, the startling event or condition that must occur for purposes of the
excited utterance exception need not be the ‘principal act’ underlying the
case . . . . For example, a later startling event may trigger associations
with an original trauma, recreating the stress earlier produced and causing
the person to exclaim spontaneously . . . . The second important principle
regarding the requirement of a startling event or condition is that the
startling nature of the event cannot be determined merely by reference to
the event itself . . . . What makes an event startling is its effect upon those
perceiving it, and an event might be startling to some but not to others.
For purposes of the excited utterance exception, therefore, it is the event’s
effect on the declarant that must be focused upon.63
Of those state courts that contended with issues of reexcitement—through their
state’s version of the excited utterance exception in their Rules of Evidence—they
affirm the validity of the reexcitement analysis and find that, “a statement made
several weeks after the original event may be admitted as an excited utterance
because a second event was sufficiently startling to render the statement made in
response thereto admissible.”64
The reexcitement analysis is generally applied to cases where a statement of
identification is made by a victim-declarant. Similar to Napier, the highest court in
Colorado has admitted the reexcited statements of identification by a child victim
made upon viewing photographs of the alleged defendant.65 Other courts, too, have
admitted reexcited statements that identify the perpetrator of the crime.66
63

State v. Chapin, 826 P.2d 194, 197 (Wash. 1992).

64

See, e.g., Byrd v. Blodgett, 1993 WL 22372, *2 (9th Cir. Wash. Feb 2, 1993) (quotations
omitted).
65

People in the Interest of O.E.P., 654 P.2d 312, 319 (Colo. 1982) (holding that statements
made by a child victim upon viewing “photographs depicting persons who subject[ed] her to
the mistreatment is a type of event which would engender substantial excitement in the child
and . . . constitutes an independent predicate for admitting the statement as an excited
utterance.”).
66

See, e.g., State v. Meyer, 694 S.W.2d 853 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that rape
victim’s reexcited assertive conduct of identification fell under the reexcitement theory
advocated by Napier); People v. Grubbs, 112 A.D.2d 104 (N.Y.A.D. 1 Dept. 1985) (holding
that statements of identification made after a victim of attempted rape saw her attacker in the
subway and became very nervous, upset, and fearful were admissible under the reexcitement
analysis set forth in Napier).
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Comparable to the facts in Bayne, New Mexico courts have also allowed reexcited
statements made by a child victim upon being returned to the location where the
original molestation occurred.67
Another unifying similarity running through each of the reexcitement cases is the
unique psychological ramifications that exist as a result of the original crime. By far,
the most vociferous proponents of the reexcited utterance standard are those courts
overseeing cases of child abuse and molestation—a crime that has unique and
profound psychological consequences.
Two state supreme courts have controversially admitted reexcited statements
made by children after emotionally waking from a dream about the original event of
the abuse.68 Tennessee courts have also admitted reexcited statements by child
victims when those statements are coupled with circumstantial evidence of pain in
the genital area from urination.69 In fact, Tennessee courts have generally allowed
excited statements when additional circumstantial evidence bolsters the
trustworthiness.70 Further evidence that courts are more prone to apply the
reexcitement analysis in cases involving child-victims, is when those reexcited
statements are triggered by an everyday and commonplace occurrence. The
Wyoming Supreme Court admitted a statement made by a child victim of abuse
when triggered by a regular activity of getting dressed for bed, while Washington
Supreme Court refused to admit a reexcited statement triggered by an everyday
occurrence involving an adult victim.71 Child abuse cases have also been
distinguished from other cases when ruling on statements made to family members.72

67

Esser v. Com, 566 S.E.2d 876, 879-880 (Va. App. 2002) (following the reexcitement
analysis in Napier and Bayne in holding that statements made when the victim “believed she
was to be returned to the place where she was assaulted and to the control of appellant, the
man who had raped and sexually assaulted her” constituted excited utterances); In the Matter
of Troy P., 842 P.2d at 743-747 (holding that a four-year-old girl’s near hysterical statements
referencing a molestation occurring more than several weeks earlier constituted an excited
utterance because the girl was reexcited upon being returned to the place where the
inappropriate touching occurred).
68
See George v. State, 813 S.W.2d 792, 795-96 (Ark. 1991) (holding that statements made
by the child-victim upon waking from a dream are admissible as a reexcited utterance); State
v. Boston 545 N.E.2d 1220, 1231 (Ohio 1989) (holding that reexcited statements made by a
child-victim upon waking from a dream are admissible under the excited utterance exception).
69

See State v. Gordon, 952 S.W.2d 817, 821 (Tenn. 1997) (holding that pain experienced
by a three-year-old victim of molestation while attempting to urinate “as opposed to the sexual
offense itself constituted a startling event” under the Napier reexcitement analysis, and
therefore statements fell under the excited utterance exception).
70

See State v. Burns, 29 S.W.3d 40, 47 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999) (affirming Napier, yet
finding that statements made after an emotional reaction to hearing the defendant’s name by
the burned child victim did not fall under the excited utterance exception).
71
Compare In re Parental Rights of G.P., 679 P.2d 976, 1004 (Wyo. 1984) (regardless of
whether the declarant’s “statements were triggered by the abusive act during her home visit or
the subsequent pain [and reexcitement] she experienced while being dressed for bed,” her
statements were admissible under the excited utterance exception) with State v. Chapin, 826
P.2d 194, 198-99 (Wash. 1992) (affirming Napier’s reexcitement theory but finding the
excited utterance exception inapplicable because there was a period of calm before the elderly
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Interestingly, the Advisory Committee Notes to Federal Rule of Evidence 803(1)
cite Sanitary Grocery Co. v. Snead73, a case that preceded Napier, but may also be
categorized within Napier’s line of reexcitement cases because the excited utterance
there also refers to a past event.74 Unlike Napier and its progeny, however, the past
event in Snead is objectively unexciting.75
In Snead, a store clerk’s excited and nervous statement after a customer slipped
and fell in his grocery store was found to be admissible under the excited utterance
exception.76 The statement referred to the clerk’s observation that the produce upon
which the customer slipped had been on the floor for several hours.77 The event of
viewing produce on the ground, however, is not objectively exciting. Upon seeing
such items on the ground, a store clerk would likely foresee a higher likelihood of
customer injury and thus have a duty to clean or remove the items. The clerk,
however, would not be so excited upon viewing the produce that his capacity to
fabricate would momentarily be suspended.
This case substantially augments the validity of the reexcitement analysis,
because it is evidence that the Advisory Committee anticipated Napier-like cases
where the excited statement referenced an unexciting past event. That this case was
explicitly mentioned in the Advisory Committee Notes is demonstrative of the
Congressional intent behind the Federal Rules of Evidence. Obviously, Snead was
prominent enough for the Advisory Committee to take note of and use as a model to
illustrate the allowable lapse of time in the excited utterance exception.
If the Advisory Committee was willing to admit statements which explain and
relate to a non-exciting past event under Snead, it is even more likely that it would
admit statements which explain and relate to an exciting event under Napier. Snead
merely required that the statement result from a new exciting event when explaining
another past, unexciting event. Napier and its progeny, however, require that the
initial event be exciting and that the second event both rekindle emotions from the
nursing home resident made his allegations of rape, and the statements were triggered by
ordinary, not unusual activities by his caretaker/alleged rapist).
72

Compare State v. Owens, 899 P.2d 833, 836 (Wash. Ct. App. 1 1995) (questions by
family members regarding an earlier molestation recreated the original stress; therefore,
statements made by the child-victim immediately afterwards qualified as excited utterances)
with State v. Henry, No. 9405000365, 1995 Del. Super LEXIS 185, at *3-4 (Del. Super Ct.
March 24, 1995) (distinguishing Napier from facts where an elderly victim—who had broken
his hip after being punched in the face by the defendant—trembled and wept while uttering,
“he punched me,” while awaiting surgery, was not admissible because the victim had time to
consult with family and was visibly calmer from the time of initial the battery unlike the facts
in Napier).
73

90 F.2d. 374 (D.C. Cir. 1937).

74

Id. at 376-77. The committee used the case to illustrate the distinction between the
present sense impression and the excited utterance exception: The excited utterance exception
is broader because the admissible statement may address a past event. FED. R. EVID. 801(1)
and 801(2) Advisory Committee Notes.
75

Snead, 90 F.2d at 376-77.

76

Id.

77

Id.
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initial event and thus generate an excited statement that explains the past event.
Therefore, if the Advisory Committee consciously included Snead within the
definition of the excited utterance exception, it must have also meant to include
reexcitement cases like Napier, which are even more trustworthy because the earlier
exciting event increases the likelihood that the declarant’s reexcitement was genuine
and actually stilled his or her reflective faculties.
Although the reexcitement theory has been uniformly acknowledged by state
courts, it has not been subjected to extensive federal judicial criticism—the Ninth
Circuit in its Napier opinion is the only circuit to speak dispositively regarding
reexcitement. The federal court progeny directly affirming the reexcitement concept
consist of brief statements by military courts or unpublished decisions of the Ninth
Circuit restating Napier’s holding and finding the reexcitement analysis inapplicable.
One court aptly sums up the current state of the application of reexcitement as
follows:
The argument that statements made after one has calmed down can never
be excited utterances presents an unsettled legal question. The implicit
premise underlying the excited utterance exception is that a person who
reacts to a startling event or condition while under the stress of
excitement caused thereby will speak truthfully because of the lack of
opportunity to fabricate . . . . This premise becomes more tenuous where
the exciting influence has dissipated and one has had the opportunity to
deliberate or fabricate. Even if one were to have a renewal of the stress
involved in the original exciting event, the existence of a deliberative
period increases the concern that subsequent statements will be inaccurate
or contrived. On the other hand, some courts and commentators have
accepted the premise that even after the excitement of a startling event has
dissipated, a subsequent statement may constitute an excited utterance if a
renewal of the excitement provides an adequate safeguard against
fabrication.78
Though there is no pronounced pattern of cases—either by state or federal courts—
directly addressing the ills arising from the reexcitement analysis, the reexcitement
concept is but a part of a larger movement in evidence law—that pertaining to the
subjectivization of the excited utterance exception—that has been heavily criticized
by proponents of the objective res gestae standard.
V. EVOLUTIONARY HISTORY OF THE EXCITED UTTERANCE EXCEPTION AND
CRITICISM OF THE UNPRECEDENTED “SUBJECTIVIZATION” OF THE EXCITED
UTTERANCE STANDARD
Prior to Professor Wigmore’s definition of the excited utterance exception,
scholars primarily used the res gestae doctrine to justify the exception.79 The res

78

United States v. Donaldson, 58 M.J. 477, 483 (C.A.A.F. 2003) (quotations omitted)
(emphases added).
79
The excited utterance exception is also referred to as the spontaneous exclamation or
spontaneous declaration exception. This alternative moniker is demonstrative of the res
gestae origins of the excited utterance exception. See 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 268
(John W. Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999); see also Chapin, 826 P.2d at 198 (noting that the res
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gestae doctrine focused not on the reflective faculties of the declarant, but on the
strict contemporaneousness of the statement with the exciting event, so that the
statement was essentially a continuation of the event.80 If the verbal response is
made simultaneously with the exciting occurrence, it “can be considered part of the
event which causes it.”81 The res gestae doctrine focuses on the insufficiency of
time for—not the reflective capacity of—the declarant to fabricate or contrive any
response, so that the hearsay statement is likely to be a truthful reflection of the
declarant’s true observations or beliefs.82
Wigmore’s endorsement of deliberation over spontaneity ultimately superceded
the res gestae doctrine as the lynchpin to the excited utterance exception.83
Wigmore’s modern psychological justification relegated the contemporaneous time
requirement to only provide guidance as to whether there was any reflective
capacity, so that the statement was not a result of fabrication.84 One author
documents the evolution as follows: “The excited utterance doctrine has evolved
from the concept of res gestae, requiring simultaneity between the underlying event
and the descriptive statement, to virtually abandoning a temporal requirement
between the event and the statement.”85 Thus, the modern evolution has been a part
of the gradual transformation of the excited utterance exception from an objective
measure of excitement—only a short period of time is reasonable to maintain
excitement—to a subjective measure of excitement—looking to that individual’s
reflective faculties.
Critics claim that the deterioration of the time requirement between the
objectively exciting event and the utterance—as illustrated by Napier and its
progeny—has resulted in erratic and increasingly relaxed applications by the courts
gestae doctrine was dubbed the common law equivalent of the excited utterance exception,
and also that which the excited utterance exception was derived from res gestae).
80
See Conti & Gitnik, supra note 39, at 244 (decrying the current premise underlying the
excited utterance exception, and advocating a return to the res gestae analysis).
81

Id.

82

See WIGMORE, supra note 9, at § 1745; see also MCCORMICK supra note 79, at § 268.

83
See MCCORMICK supra note 79 at § 271.
Wigmore, however, saw as the basis for the spontaneous exclamation exception, not
the contemporaneousness of the exclamation, but rather the nervous excitement
produced by the exposure of the declarant to an exciting event. As a result, the
American law of spontaneous statements shifted in its emphasis from what Thayer had
observed to an exception based on the requirement of an exciting event and the
resulting stifling of the declarant’s reflective faculties.

Id.
84

See WIGMORE, supra note 9, at § 1756
The declaration . . . may be admissible even though subsequent to the occurrence,
provided it is near enough in time to allow the assumption that the exciting influence
continued. It is therefore an error to apply to the present exception the verbal act rule
that the utterance must be precisely contemporaneous with the act or occurrence.
There was in the beginning a tendency to commit this error. But at the present day
this error seems to have been almost everywhere repudiated.
Id. (emphasis added).
85

Siegel, supra note 43, at 1242 (emphasis added).
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as to what constitutes a reasonable chronological proximity between the statement
and the exciting event.86 This deterioration has led critics of the current
interpretation of the excited utterance exception to disparage the focus on the
declarant’s reflective faculties.
The 803(2) exception’s greatest flaw inheres in the fact that there is no
objective method of determining how much time may pass between the
exciting event and the excited utterance. Courts have, however, agreed
that the excited statement does not need to be made contemporaneously or
even on the same day as the exciting event. This lack of objectivity leaves
us with a rule that is lacking in uniformity, full of unpredictability, and
unfair.87
It is this evolution that has both defined and paved the way for the advent of
reexcitement cases. However, critics claim that this evolution constitutes an
exorbitant pattern of over-expansion which eviscerates the underlying aims of the
exception.88
Critics disdainfully contend that the expansion of the excited utterance exception
since Wigmore’s reclassification has destructively construed the composite elements
of the exception as flexible guiding elements rather than mandatory to the
functioning of the exception. Without a bright line test clearly indicating to the court
whether such evidence is admissible, there will be discriminatory and wavering
application of the exception to facts that are remarkably similar, thus subjecting
members of the public to a double standard.89 Furthermore, the judicial opinions that
result may not be adequately challenged by the parties and may result in binding
precedent, especially because “[l]itigants may not have the incentive or the resources
to appeal decisions that are not clearly prejudicial or where the admission of hearsay
did not contribute to the jury’s verdict.”90
The intended beneficiaries of the increasingly subjective interpretation of the
exception are those victims of particularly heinous crimes—especially violence or
abuse against children, murder, rape, or domestic violence.91 However, the
86
See M. C. Slough, Spontaneous Statements and State of Mind, 46 Iowa L. Rev. 224, 243
(1961) (looking at the prolonged duration of intervening time between the exciting event and
the declaration).
87

Conti & Gitnik, supra note 39, at 235 (emphases added).

88

See Siegel, supra note 43, at 1255-56 (providing illustrative case law from
Massachusetts, documenting the pattern of courts allowing excited statements, even given
evidence that the declarants were not excited and of the significant lapse of time); see also
Conti & Gitnik, supra note 39, at 236-44 (looking to demonstrative rape and child abuse cases
which show inconsistency in the spontaneity of the statement after the exciting event).
89

See Conti & Gitnik, supra note 39, at 250 (“The current predicament inheres in the ‘no
time for reflection’ element, as courts make arbitrary and discretionary determinations . . . .
Consequently, with regard to homicide, rape, and child abuse cases, courts utilize differing
standards when applying the excited utterance exception, thereby resulting in unpredictable
decisions.”).
90

Siegel, supra note 43, at 1264.

91

See id. at 1256-57 (commenting on the modern trend of expanding the excited utterance
doctrine in several Massachusetts criminal cases, primarily in cases of murder, domestic
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interpretation of the excited utterance exception has since increased beyond that
realm.92 Although courts used their newfound discretion and flexibility to further
public policy and make rulings that supplement areas where the law was traditionally
lacking, their overly broad interpretations of the exception has admitted a copious
range of statements that should not otherwise be admissible.93 Such statements that
are used solely to support the sympathetic victim-declarant should instead fall under
the residual exception, rather than disfiguring, manipulating, and compromising the
excited utterance exception to the evidence at hand.94 Furthermore, “[i]f the balance
of evidentiary issues needs to be shifted in favor of the prosecution, then the court
should explicitly state such a policy.”95
Critics further allege that though the evolution of the excited utterance exception
may have been originally beneficial in protecting such victims, these victims are now
protected with newly codified and more exacting evidence rules. Those rules are
better suited to them, because the rules expressly rid specific evidentiary barriers
unique to those victims.96 Therefore, inconsistent precedent remains as a confusing
vestige that weakens the original purpose of the excited utterance exception,
excluding those who have made valid statements under the traditional definition of
the rule. One author suggests that “[t]o maintain the integrity of the judicial process,
violence, and assault); see also Conti & Gitnik, supra note 39, at 250 (commenting on that the
courts use diverging criteria in applying the excited utterance exception to rape, child abuse,
and murder cases); see also In the matter of Troy P., 842 P.2d at 747 (summarizing cases
“upholding the admissibility of children’s excited utterances naming the defendant
immediately upon awaking in the middle of the night”); see George, 813 S.W.2d at 795-96
(holding that physically abused child’s excited statement made after a frightening dream
admissible); State v. Boston 545 N.E.2d 1220, 1231 (Ohio 1989) (finding a molested child’s
statement made after a nightmarish dream admissible as an excited utterance).
92
See Siegel, supra note 43, at 1275.
By repeatedly expanding, and arguably effectively eliminating, the temporal
requirement implicit in the excited utterance exception in the criminal context,
Massachusetts courts have inconsistently applied the exception under a rationale
which no longer holds true. The term itself, whether spontaneous exclamation or
excited utterance, includes the notion of an immediate or stressful condition caused by
an underlying event. Courts have contorted the exception in order to reach desired
results or correct perceived social ills by permitting the introduction of hearsay
testimony made substantially after the event.

Id.
93

See id. at 1266-67 (noting that in general, cases in which the excited utterance exception
has been expanded are “highly emotional events likely to inspire excited utterances, such as
murder, assault, and sexual assault, and many of the cases involve children.”).
94

See id. at 1270-72 (explaining that explicit laws should be made to encompass changes
in social policy, rather than awkwardly contorting a time-honored law).
95

Id. at 1271-72.

96

See FED. R. EVID. 413; see also FED. R. EVID. 414; Siegel supra note 43, at 1271-72
(“other jurisdictions . . . explicitly recognize evidentiary rules based on social policies
designed to achieve a desired application of substantive law” such as section 1370 of the
California Evidence Code which “created a ‘new hearsay exception for a declarant’s hearsay
statements narrating, describing or explaining the infliction or the threat of physical injury
upon the declarant by the party against who the statement is offered.’”).
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trial judges should restrain from admitting out-of-court statements into evidence
under the current excited utterance exception. Stretching the excited utterance
exception undermines the consistency necessary in the judicial process.”97 The widereaching inclusiveness of the rule now provides a gaping loophole for nonmeritorious statements to come in as evidence.98
VI. DEFENDING AND REIGNING IN THE EXCESSES OF THE EXCITED
UTTERANCE EXCEPTION
The modern excited utterance exception, as illustrated by Napier, is not
necessarily a lesser standard for the proponent of the evidence to meet; it is an
exception that merely affords the district courts greater discretion99 in molding the
97

Siegel, supra note 43, at 1271.

98

There has, however, been backing for the current state of the excited utterance exception
from the highest judicial authority in the United States. The greatest support offered for the
modern day excited utterance exception is the positive affirmation offered by the Supreme
Court in two cases dealing with the Confrontation Clause. In a 1992 decision, the Supreme
Court stated that “‘firmly rooted’ exceptions carry sufficient indicia of reliability to satisfy the
reliability requirement posed by the Confrontation Clause.” White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346,
502 n.8 (1992). Moreover, the excited utterance exception is a firmly rooted exception to the
rule against hearsay, and therefore sufficiently reliable to protect the criminal defendant of his
Constitutional right to confront all accusers:
[T]he evidentiary rationale for permitting hearsay testimony regarding spontaneous
declarations . . . is that such out-of-court declarations are made in contexts that provide
substantial guarantees of their trustworthiness. But those same factors that contribute
to the statements’ reliability cannot be recaptured even by later in-court testimony. A
statement that has been offered in a moment of excitement—without the opportunity
to reflect on the consequences of one’s exclamation—may justifiably carry more
weight with a trier of fact than a similar statement offered in the relative calm of the
courtroom.
Id. at 355-56.
Additionally, in a 1990 decision, the Supreme Court found that showing “particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness” required an analysis of the totality of the circumstances that
surround the declarant’s making of the statement. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 819 (1990).
In dicta, the Supreme Court buttressed the circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness
underlying the excited utterance exception by stating that “[t]he basis for the ‘excited
utterance’ exception . . . is that such statements are given under circumstances that eliminate
the possibility of fabrication, coaching, or confabulation, and that therefore the circumstances
surrounding the making of the statement provide sufficient assurance that the statement is
trustworthy and that cross-examination would be superfluous.” Id. at 820.
The highest court has endorsed Wigmore’s justification of the excited utterance exception
and, therefore, has heartily agreed that a statement made in a highly excited state is
trustworthy and reliable enough to pass the Constitutional requirements articulated in the
Confrontation Clause because of the lack of reflective faculties to fabricate.
Furthermore, res gestae critics of the excited utterance exception should be appeased because
res gestae considerations are at work in many other accepted hearsay exceptions. For
example, “[r]es gestae also sired the hearsay exceptions for present-sense impressions, excited
utterances, direct evidence of state of mind, and statements made to physicians.” Orenstein,
supra note 39, at 169.
99

Giving courts an exception based more on a subjective inquiry affords the courts with
more discretion in admitting the evidence.
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exception based on circumstantial evidence and the egregiousness of the crime—two
elements which speak to the subjective excitement experienced by the declarant.100
To understand one’s mental ability to fabricate requires the court to subjectively
assess this situation and use its authority to balancing competing factors. The
exception still requires a showing of corroborating evidence that supports a court’s
judgment that the declarant was subjectively excited.101 All laws made by Congress
are to some degree either over- or under-inclusive, but courts, in applying this
exception, may best minimize the misapplication of the law through the monitoring
device of court discretion.
In response to critics’ claims that the controversial evolution of the excited
utterance exception has resulted in non-uniform and highly deviant cases—and now
has the great potential for misuse because of inconsistent and complicated precedent
and complicated cases such as Napier—one must document the actual usage of the
exception. Critics focus only on the ills that have resulted from use of the exception
and not the wide-reaching benefits for those traditionally disadvantaged individuals
such as victims of domestic abuse, child molestation, and rape.
The excited utterance exception serves to illustrate the changing policy behind
the law, and the evolution of the law to meet those new aims. Just because there has
been a shift in the application of the underlying principle of the excited utterance
exception does not necessarily indicate that there has been a regression, but that the
law has merely adapted its historical aims to new societal principles. When the
defendant has committed an egregious crime where the victim is historically not
afforded enough protections in the law, the courts have intervened and used the
excited utterance exception to correct these historical barriers.
Humans,
psychological understanding,102 and society change over time. As they do, so does
the meaning and the interpretation of the exceptions.
One must, nonetheless, guard against the great pitfalls in granting the courts too
much discretion. One scholar writes,
If we used a rule similar to 403 to control the broad admissibility of
hearsay, or if we have more fluid exceptions, we cede more power to
judges. The more open-ended a rule is, the more it is subject to differing

100

Saltzburg, supra at note 26, at 43.
There is no thermometer-type test for excited utterances; statements must be examined
in light of all circumstances. There is no time period, corroboration, or other
thermometer-type test that will provide clear notice . . . to prosecutors and defense
counsel as to statements that will qualify as excited utterances and those that will not.
Judges will often have to assess the circumstances surrounding a statement in order to
decide whether or not it is admissible. Because the judge sits as a fact finder,
appellate courts will defer to the judgment of a trial court on admissibility decisions.
Id.
101

Id. at 42. “Although questions are not disqualifying, evasive answers or inconsistent
statements may suggest that the stress of excitement has given way to contemplative answers.”
Id.
102

Psychological processes are complex and constantly influenced by the level of
psychological advancements; therefore, the lower level of understanding of psychology when
the excited utterance exception was developed might not be applicable today. See Orenstein,
supra note 39, at 159-223.
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interpretations. The more a rule can be interpreted in various ways, the
more power the interpreter has.103
The scholar also writes of the possible slippery slope argument: “Such an
extension would greatly change our litigation. It should mean that the hearsay about
the incident for anyone who suffered violence, or perhaps the threat of violence,
should be admissible.”104 True, there must be safeguards, but as we have seen from
the current pattern of use of the excited utterance exception in case law, the
preexisting evidentiary thresholds coupled with court discretion serve to weed out
unreliable statements.105
It is true that the most effective means of applying the law would be to provide a
bright line rule explicitly delineating the boundaries of the excited utterance
exception. Such a bright line rule would, however, fail to take into account the true
psychological considerations of possessing such an excited state as being unable to
reflect and therefore fabricate excited statements. The excited utterance is
distinguishable from the bright line hearsay exceptions because it looks to the
excited state of the declarant—and this subjective test necessarily requires the court
to take a balancing approach. Because hearsay is an all-or-nothing approach, it will
necessarily exclude that which is trustworthy. Therefore, hearsay exceptions based
on discretionary balancing are the best available methods to reconcile the opposing
rights of victims and criminal defendants and to provide a countervailing protection
against the exacting nature of the hearsay rule.106
VII. RECENT CHANGES IN THE LAW THAT WILL CHANGE THE FUTURE LANDSCAPE
FOR THE REEXCITED UTTERANCE ANALYSIS
In Crawford v. Washington,107 a landmark Confrontation Clause case handed
down in 2004, the Supreme Court found that it is a Constitutional violation under the
Sixth Amendment to disallow the defendant from cross-examining the declarant

103

Randolph N. Jonakait, “My God! Is This How a Feminist Analyzes Excited Utterances?
4 WM. & MARY J. OF WOMEN & L. 263, 286 (1997).
104

Id. at 290.

105

The proponent of the evidence, under a preponderance of the evidence standard, bears
the burden of proof to establish that the declarant was excited. See FED. R. EVID. 103(a).
Therefore, the court must assess the corroborating evidence around the statement to determine
whether the declarant was sufficiently excited. “Preliminary questions concerning the
qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of
evidence shall be determined by the court.” FED. R. EVID. 104(a). Though the proponent of
the evidence may attempt to bootstrap—that is, admit the statement under the excited
utterance exception, claiming that the statement itself is evidence of the excitement—the
hearsay protections are still present because the excitement must still be proven to the court by
the preponderance standard before the court will admit such evidence. Holland, supra note
35, at 182 (“[U]nless some other evidence corroborates the complainant’s assertion of the
startling event, the excited utterance alone would admit itself for its own truth. This presents a
rather convenient tautology: the statement becomes admissible simply because the
complainant said it.”).
106

Orenstein, supra note 39, at 193.

107

541 U.S. 36 (2004).
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regarding his or her testimonial statement. “Where testimonial statements are at
issue, the only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is
the one the Constitution actually prescribes: confrontation.”108 This holding has
profound effects on reexcitement cases involving statements made for a police
investigation—such statements include those made while identifying the perpetrator
at a line up or during a police interrogation. Reexcitement is logically related to
testimonial statements, for it is commonplace for a victim to become reexcited when
recounting exciting events to law enforcement officials. There have been cases
where the courts have admitted testimonial statements under Napier’s reexcitement
analysis;109 however, courts generally tend to disallow the evidence on facts that
indicated that the statements were not made in an excited state.110
Viewing the Napier in light of the recent Crawford decision, the potential
dangers present in the reexcitement cases—namely, the discreet pressures and other
societal influences in the period after the original exciting event—can be better
evaluated and exposed through cross-examination. The reasoning behind Napier and
Bayne was tenuous because both cases failed to address the effect that intervening
influences might have had on the reexcited statement. Therefore, requiring that the
defendant be given an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant on testimonial
statements partially mitigates the dangers present in the reexcitement analysis.
VIII. CONCLUSION
It is clear that the reexcitement analysis has both benefits and detriments.
Reexcitement may be a basis for admission of evidence in cases where the danger of
influencing during the calm period is somehow obviated—as in the recent Crawford
opinion. Because of the heightened danger of undue influence in reexcitement cases,
the courts should require corroborating evidence that the declarant did not confide in
anyone during the intervening period of calm, to reduce the chance of outside
pressures and influences. Congress should provide an amendment to the Federal
Rules of Evidence expressly allowing for reexcitement, but also requiring either
physical corroborating evidence of the truthfulness of the statement or the declarant
to be available for cross-examination—similar to Napier and the child abuse cases.
Therefore, with the defendant’s opportunity to cross-examine, she may lead the fact
finder to question the biased nature of the declarant’s statement. Furthermore, the
108

Id.

109

See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Santiago, 774 N.E.2d 143 (Mass. 2002) (holding that
statements made by the mother of the victim upon seeing the accused being arrested by police
admissible under the excited utterance standard).
110

See, e.g., Portillo v. U.S., 710 A.2d 883, 885 (D.C. 1998) (though the victim-declarant
saw the assailant immediately preceding her interview with police and was therefore reexcited,
because she was calm in demeanor and evasive in her answers, her statements did not fall
under the excited utterance exception); Biggins v. State, 73 S.W.3d 502, 504 (Tex. App. 2002)
(holding that although there had been a period of calm from the original event of molestation,
the statements made by the 19-year-old victim to police officers were not a product of
reexcitement, but part of the unbroken chain of resulting “emotions, excitement, fear, or pain
resulting from the occurrence”); Mineo, 2001 WL 30184 at, *5 (citing Napier on the theory of
reexcitement, but finding that although reexcitement is valid under the excited utterance
exception, the details of domestic violence that the victim offered to the police officers were
too “detailed and lengthy” and thus more likely to be the result of fabrication).
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requirement of physical evidence that substantiates the excited statement also serves
the same purpose.
The uniqueness of the holdings of the reexcitement cases may be due to the
severity and the egregiousness of the crimes, the substantial amount of circumstantial
evidence that was available to buttress allegations of the defendants’ guilt, or the
particularly sympathetic nature of the plaintiffs.111 Nevertheless, the reexcitement
cases present profound questions regarding how much time constitutes enough time
for “calm reflection” and what constitutes a “startling event or condition.”
Ultimately, the reexcitement cases are an indicator of the high water mark of the
excited utterance exception—an exception which has been deemed by some to be the
“unofficial garbage pail of hearsay exceptions.”112 The Napier case and its progeny,
applying the reexcitement analysis, scholarly commentary, and the ramifications of
conclusions obtained from these combined sources have profound consequences on
evidence law. It uncertain whether reexcitement cases are to be categorized as
merely a part of the expansion of the excited utterance exception, or as an anomaly
analysis in a class of its own. It is, however, certain that the modern day
interpretation of the excited utterance marks a pattern of changing societal attitudes
which reflect an increasing awareness of the distinct aspects of a victim’s
psychological state.

111

See Napier, 518 F.2d at 317-18.

112

See Orenstein, supra note 39, at 177.
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